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THE RIGHT OF SURFACE SUPPORT.
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
(Continued from March number).
Let us see then how the duty to support "laterally" differs
from the duty to support vertically. In Fyfe v. Turtle Creek
Borough, 22 Superior Court 292, it is said at page 296 that: "The
right of lateral support, as between individual owners, is the
right to have land in its natural state supported by the adjacent
land, It is well settled that the right appertains only to the land,
and not to buildings, and other artificial improvements thereon
erected. When an owner makes an excavation upon his land, in
a manner free from negligence, and so deprives a neighbor's
property of lateral support, his liability for damages is limited to
the injuryto the landwihouregardto the buildhngs."' Now it will
be remembered that in Noonan v. Pardee the mines had been operated since 1874 and that Noonan did not build his house till after
1890. But the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for
the injury to his house, if he could recover at all, that is, if he
could show a removal of vertical suppott. It thus appears that
the surface owner is entitled to support from the owner of the
underlying minerals, not only for the house that may be on it at
the time the division of ownership begins, but also for houses
which he may erect many years later.2
'See also Matuey v, Coal and Iron Co., 201 Pa. 7o, at page 76.
2In Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sad. 84, it is held that this duty to support
subsequently erected buildings is limited to "an ordinary house" and does

not extend to "an enormous building."

In England and elsewhere it is held

that the mine owner owes no duty to support buildings erected after he acquired his title to the minerals. His only duty is to maintain the status quo.
Richards v. Jenkins, 18 Law Times (N. S.) 438; M. M. D., 36o; Marvin v.
v. Brewster Iron Co., 55 N. Y., 538. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199.
In Gumbert v. Kilgore, supra, it was held that no damages could be recovered, if the extra weight of the house caused the subsidence.
(147)
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This being the difference in the duty in the two cases, let us
see what is the difference in the measure of damages. Presumably inserted to point out the difference, which the court says
exists, we find on page 488 this quotation from McGettigan v.
Potts, 149 Pa. 158, which was a case involving the duty of lateral
support: "Where, by reason of an excavation, without negligence
made by defendant on his own land, the land of the plaintiff
sinks or falls away, the measure of damages is not the diminution
in value of the lot of the plaintiff, by reason of the defendant,
but the amount of injury actually done to the 6laintizf's land."
When we compare this with the rule laid down in Noonan v.
Pardee as governing in the case of vertical support, we find, not
the announced difference, but seeming identity. For, to our surprise, the court says that, "their measure of damages is the
actuat loss they have sustained *
*
*
The diference in
market value before and after the injury in this class of cases is
not the true rule."
In the light of a later case, however, we find that there is
in fact a difference. In McGettigan v. Potts, supra, it was held
that the damages for a failure to support laterally were not to be
estimated by calculating what it would cost to restore the land
to its former condition. (This would have cost $575). The one
whose land has slipped away laterally can only recover the value
of the dirt lost. Since he could only have sold the dirt lost for
$95, this was all he got, though it was found as a fact that the
lot was worth $620 less after the loss than it was worth before.
In Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Company, 213 Pa. 252, on the
other hand, it is held that for a failure to furnish verticalsupport, the damages for an injury to the surface of a permanent
character, which might render it less available for building purposes, are to be estimated by a calculation of the depreciation in
the value of the property. "Other injuries, such as the sinking
of the dwelling house and the opening of cracks were remediable. For these the cost of repair or restoration is obviously the
measure of the damages." It was pointed out by counsel in
this case that such a decision involved the ignoring of the recent
ruling in Noonan v. Pardee, but the Supreme Court did not
hesitate to do that.1 In holding that the depreciation in value
of the property is the true measure of damages between Private
Persons whenever the injury is of a permanent character, this
'May we not pray that they will soon exhibit a like attitude toward the
decision with reference to the other points involved?
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case (Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co.) overrules McGettigan v.
Potts also, for the latter case had distinctly held that this rule
only applies where the injuty has been inflicted by a corporation
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain. In Jones v.
Greenfield, 25 Super. Ct. 315, Judge Orlady curiously says that
one may recover the cost of restoring the land to the state in
which it was before a subsidence occurred, even in the case of
lateralsuhport, the kind of case he had before him. This leads
us to hope that the absurd rule of McGettigan v. Potts, limiting
the recovery to th value of the dirt lost, will soon be overruled
by our Supreme Court, and the rule of Rabe v. Shoenberger
Coal Co. be applied without distinction in cases of lateral as well
as surface support. As was forcibly said in Williams v. Missouri
Furnace Company, 13 Mo. App. 70, "Such a rule is clearly
against reason. It affords no substantial compensation to one
who has suffered a substantial injury. There is no substance
more plentiful than the soil on which we walk, and it cannot be
shown that a quantity of loose dirt has any substantial value.
It may, indeed, have a very considerable value to a proprietor
when resting in its natural state in a lot of ground owned by
him." The depreciation in the value of the lot as a lot for
building purposes would be the only fair measure if the owner
had bought to resell. If he bought that he might build his
home, and he has to bring other dirt from a distance to grade
his lot, it is hard to see why he should not recover the cost of
getting the amount of soil lost from some other place. Since the
right of ownership entitles him either to sell or to use, it follows
that the owner should receive as damages a sum large enough to
compensate him for any loss suffered in the exercise of either of
these rights. Whichever is the larger sum, cost of repair or depreciation in value, if there is a difference, (as there was found to
be in McGettigan v. Potts) the one injured should receive such
amount.
That the decision of Noonan v. Pardee was a flagrant case
of a court's making law, instead of declaring it, is strikingly
shown by the vicissitudes of Pantall v. Coal & Iron Co. reported
in 18 Super Ct. 341, and in 204 Pa. 158. Pantall sold the coal
under his sixty acres of land. In 1894 he brought action for
certain subsidences which had occured. Since all ttle subsidences
which had occurred at that date were located on the one side of
the tract, he only claimed damages in his statement for injuries
done to twenty-nine acres. The trial did not occur till 1898, and
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during the intervening four years further subsidences occurred
all over the sixty acres. Before the trial Pantall gave notice
that he would ask for all the damages suffered up to the date of
the trial,' so far as the twenty-nine acres were concerned. No
objection was made to this, and he recoverred for all his damages
to the twenty-nine acres. He then began another suit for the
damages to the thirty-one other acres. No subsidences had occurred on them since the trial of the first suit, but some had occurred
after the first suit was begun. Now it had been held in McGowan
v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 572, that one may recover not only present
but also firospective damages. The defendant company, therefore, contended, that when the plaintiff brought his first suit, he
was able to recover for all the subsidences likely ever to occur in
the whole sixty acres. They justly complained that they were
being subjected to two suits, where all the damages should have
been claimed and collected in one. Judge Beaver admitted that
all the damages to the entire tract could have been recovered in
the first suit, but held that since the plaintiff had limited his
claim to the injuries done to twenty-nine acres, and since the defendant then made no comflaint as to this, it was only fair that
Pantall should later recover for the injuries to the thirty-one
acres, and the company had no standing then to object to the
multiplicity of suits. It appeared that no coal was mined under
any of the sixty acres after 1894, when the first suit was begun,
but (all parties being of the opinion that the right of action
arose only whefi the subsidence occurred) this fact was not regarded as important. Judge Beaver thought it very important
that there were no subsidences as yet on the thirty-one acres,
when the first suit was begun. Why it should have been so regarded is hard to see. The plaintiff, it was said, could recover
for all the prospective damages to these acres. The subsidences
only made the damage a little easier for the jury to estimate.
This seems to have been what worried him. He said: "WMhether
or not it was possible to determinefrom the manner in which the
coal was mined the suzffczency of the suphortsfor the surface,
does not a/j:ear.' If the mining had been negligently done and it
'Under the Act of May 2d, 1876, P. L. 95.
2Judge Beaver evidently realized that it is impossible to determine the
sufficiency of the supports for the surface. Yet under the present rule this
is what the jury is bound to do, for only one suit can be brought for all injuries, present and prospective, to any one tract. In Miles v. Penna. Coal
Co. 214 Pa. S44, Judge Kelly of Lackawanna County said that the extent to
which the surface will subside is a matter which cannot be foretold with
any degree of certainty.
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had appeared from the testimony that the supports from under
the entire farm had been withdrawn, the damages which had
actually occurred and those which miglt reasonably be exlpected
might well have been included in the first suit." He does not
say, however, that Pantall was bound to produce such evidence
He says
or else be forever barred, as we would expect.
instead that since he did not do this, he can now recover,
when the subsidence has made the damage more easy of proof.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Mitchell said
that the error of all parties concerned, judge and lawyers, was in
regarding the subsidence as the cause of action. The lawyers
on both sides had submitted points to this effect. He held that
Judge Beaver with this theory in mind, had decided correctly.
If each subsidence was a new cause of action, then Pantall could
not have recovered in his first suit for any subsidences which occurred after he'had begun his suit; for the act of 1876 only applies to
continuing trespasses and not to separate causes of action, though
similar in kind and effect. Justice Mitchell overlooked the fact that
Pantall did in fact recover in the firstsuit for subsidences that occurred on the twenty-nine acres between 1894 and 1898, that is, after
the suit was begun. The defendant did not object to this. The
only reason, therefore, why Pantall did not recover in the first
action for all the subsidences on the entire tract up to 1898, was
because he did not ask for them. The deliberate and inexcusable
multiplication of suits by him was thus permitted. Justice
Mitchell refused to reverse and gave as his reason that the defendant's counsel had aided in creating the impression upon
Judge Beaver that the subsidence was the cause of action. It is
hardly surprising"that everybody was mistaken on this point inasmuch as the law enacted by Noonan vs. Pardee had not yet
been promulgated.
In Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, the Supreme Court had
unanimously decided that successive suits could be brought for
subsidences on different portions of the same property. The
plaintiff, Hay, contended that the subsequent subsidence constituted a new right of action and cited Campbell vs. Boggs, 48 Pa.
525, in which the general principle is enunciated that actions on
the case for consequential damages are not to be brought until
the consequences are developed. (This, by the way, was a case
involving the question as to when the statute of limitations begins to run.) The defendant did not contest the point, but only
urged that there was not enough evidence of the fact that the
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second suit was brought for a second subsidence. Thepoint thus
made by the plaintiff's counsel and acquiesced in by the defendant's counsel and confirmed by Justice Paxson without any dissent
from Justices Gordon, Sterrett, Green and Williams, who also
sat on the case, we are now told was all a niistake. This case
was overlooked by all the lawyers and judges in Pantall v. Coal Co.,
but is directly in point. We can thus safely say that before Noonan
v. Pardee, the Supreme Court was also mistaken as to what the
law is on this subject.
Justice Mitchell begins his opinion with the following
apology for Noonan vs. Pardee. "It was held in Noonan vs.
Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, that where there has been a horizontal division
of land, and the owner of the subjacent estate removes coal or other
mineral without leaving sufficient support, in consequence of
which the surface sinks, the cause of action is the removal of the
coal, not the subsidence of the surface, which is only consequence
and evidence of the wrongful act of removal.' The subject is
one of inherent difficulty. On the one hand the surface owner
may suffer no actual damage, and be in entire ignorance of any
invasion of his right until the statute of limitations has barred
his remedy. (For until a subsidence there is no way of discovering that there has been an invasion of his rights.) On the
other hand, the mine owners, using every care may be called
upon to respond to a claim of damages occuring years after his operations have ceased, his evidence.lost, and his liabiliity made
doubtful by other intervening causes."
Now inasmuch as the use of "every care" is an irrelevant
matter,2 if a subsidence occurs, it is hard to see the hardship in
the possibility that the mine owner may at the date of suit have
lost the evidence that he used "every care." What intervening
causes would make his liability doubtful, I wonder? The Act of
God? Yes.' A subsidence, the immediate cause of which was
an earthquake would hardly impose liability upon the mine
'Note that Justice Mitchell's adoption of Justice Dean's curious conception that because the subsidence is a resnlt or "consequence," it cannot therefore constitute the "cause of action."
2
As most emphatically held in Noonan v. Pardee.
3
1n Carlin v. Chappel, ioi Pa. 348, Justice Green says at page 358: "Of
course we do not mean to be understood as holding that this right to actual
sapport shall be superior to the consequences of convulsions of nature such
as earthquakes, and such violent disturbances as may be classified as being
the act of God."
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owners? What are the other intervening causes? Decaying timbers. And why should they not use pillars that will not soon decay, concrete, for instance?
"No rule," he continues, "can be framed which may not
at times inflct great hardship on one party or the other. Courts
of highest authority have differed on the rule to be adopted.1 In
Noonan v. Pardee the subject was most carefully considered and
the rule followed which seemed to rest on the soundest principles, and to be in accord with the best authorities."
What these
"soundest principles" are, and where we may find these "best
authorities," is stated neither in Noonan v. Pardee nor by Justice
Mitchell.
Since Pantall's case, it is now the law that only one suit can
be brought for a failure to support a given tract of land. Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, must be regarded as overruled. The
surface owner may sue as soon as a subsidence occurs and recover
all his prospective damages to the whole tract. But if he should
be so unlucky as not to have a small crack appears within six
years, he then can never recover anything. In any event he had
better wait perhaps till the six years are nearly up, so that the
present damage may be as great as possible. But if he thinks the
jury will guess his way, he should then sue as soon as the first
crack appears, for he can thus get large damages for subsidences
which may never occur. The absurdity of the rule permitting
the small crevice to be used as a peg upon which to hang a judgment for thousands of dollars, is equalled only by the rule that
permits like sums to be recovered for nervous shock, if only one
can show a scratched finger or a torn dress.2
'As a matter of fact, Noonan v. Pardee is the only case in which the
statute of limitations has been held to run from the date of the excavation,
and not from the date of the subsidence. See 6o L. R. A. 694, (1905) for
an excellent note. In Hill v. Pardee, 143 Pa. 98, the lower court held that
the right of action did not accrue until the subsidence of the surface and
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that occurrence.
Justice Mitchell reversed this decision on other grounds but passed by this
part of the lower court's decision without criticism.
2
0f course it is apparent that if the mining is regarded as tortious and
as giving a right of action before a subsidence, then one should be allowed
to sue at once and recover the full depreciation in the value of the surface
due to the danger. If the subsidence is regarded as an essential element
in the tort, then one should not be allowed to sue until a subsidence and his
recovery in each suit should be limited to the damages suffered up to that
date. Successive actions could then be brought whenever new subsidences
occur. Either rule is comprehensible and something can be said for each.
But for the composite freak adopted in Pennsylvania, what can be said?
That it is absolutely unique and has the sympathy of but one case, which
has been long repudiated and overruled, see 68 L. R. A. 690.
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Since "the cause of action is the removal of the coal and the
subsidences only evidence of it," it follows that all the evidence
of this kind that is in existence when the trial occurs can be
utilized. After starting the suit, therefore, one had better stave
off the trial as long as possible so that he may be able to show as
many subsidences as possible, for one verdict ends it all.
It appeared that there were two strata of coal under Noonan's
lot, one at a depth of one hundred feet and the other at a depth
of one hundred and fifty feet. There was evidence that the
higher vein had been worked out over thirty years before the
"cave-in," and that the recent mining was all in the lower vein.
On this point the court said: "If defendant, by mining within
six years another underlying seam, whereby the pillars and supports in the seam above, which otherwise would have been sufficient to support the surface, have been rendered insufficient, and
the "cave-in" occurred, defendant is answerable to plaintiff in
In the cases involving the duty of lateral support,
damages."
it has been held that a defendant is liable, if his excavation
caused the land of the plaintiff to give way, even though there
be intervening tracts owned by other parties. Keating v. Cin-'
cinnati, 38 Ohio St. 141. This same doctrine is thus seen to be
applicable to the duty of surface support.
It thus appears that the expression "adjoining owners,"
used constantly to describe those between whom there is a duty
Each land owner owes the
to support, is really inadequate.
duty to all others within his "zone of support," to all whose
land is at all dependant upon his for support.
It has also been held that where there are separate owners
of several strata, the owner of the superior stratum is entitled to
The owner of the lower
the support of the lower stratum.
stratum may thus expose himself to suit by both the surface
owner and the owner of the intervening stratum. Robertson v.
The Youghiogheny River Coal Co. 172 Pa. 566.1
'In Horner v. Watson, 79 Pa. 242, Justice Gordon said at page 248.
"This court, in Jones v. Wagner, adopted the English decisions upon this
subject, and as these decisions embody an experience in the business of
mining much greater than our own, they are entitled to the greatest respect.
So when we consider the sitfier-emient imjOortance of this industry to the
British Isles, we mnay be sure that the judiciary thereofwould not willingly
deprive it of any of its just rightz or privileges." Had our supreme court
kept this in mind and followed the English cases, we would have been spared
atrocity of Noonan v. Pardee.
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One other question arose in the case. Where there has been
a succession of lessees of a mine, may suit be brought against
the lessee at the time of the subsidence, or must the one injured
hunt up the old lessee, who did the excavating? The court on
page 487 says: "In a case of this character, it is of the utmost
importance that the averments should be more specific as to the
time the coal was mined under the lot and as to who mined it."
It had been contended that the mining that did the damage had
been done by the defendant's predecessor in the operation of the
mine. The court held that to hold the defendant, it must at
least be shown that he had robbed pillars or otherwise "hastened
the subsidence." The objection to this is that a corporation may
readily be formed, which may lease a mine and take out the coal,
leaving such supports only as will hold up the surface till it finishes its lease. It may then divide the spoil and dissolve. The
surface owner then is remediless, when the subsidence occurs. 1
Would it not be more reasonable to hold liable the one in possession of the subjacent estate when the subsidence occurs, and
let him recover from his predecessor if he can? The mineral
owner would then see to it that each lessee provided adequate
supports, for he would know that no one would be willing to
lease the property and assume the responsibility suggested, unless his predecessors had left proper supports.
Whether the Lehigh Valley Railroad, the owner and lessor
of the minerals in Noonan v. Pardee, could have been sued successfully by Noonan was not discussed in the case. That would
depend upon the control exercised by the railroad over the lessee
of the mine dnring the lease. Their liability depends on the
terms of their lease to Pardee. In any event their liability would
be but supplementary to the liability of their lessee, as in the case
of master and servant. For a good discussion of this point, see
Kistler v. Thompson, 158 Pa. 139; Hill v. Pardee, 143 Pa. 98;
and Little Schuylkill, etc. Co. v. Tamaqua, 1 Walker 468.
In conclusion we may state that the only conceivable justification for Noonan v. Pardee is the desire of the Supreme Court
to give us all cheap coal.' Its anxiety to do this, even though it
entail great hardship and practical confiscation of a man's home,
is strikingly exhibited in the Sanderson Case, 113 Pa. 126. As
'By statute in a number of states the owner of the surface may compel
the owner or lessee of minerals beneath it, to give security for probable

damage by mining, A most necessary provision for his protection.
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Judge Archbald has pointed out,' that decision was entirely unnecessary. Had the coal companies found that they had to compensate the owners of the land through which flowed the streams
polluted by them, they would have .done so, as in the coal dirt
cases. To deny the riparian land owner any redress for his injury
was cheaper for the coal aompanies and lessened the work of our
courts, but for the justice of the decision little can be said. After the Sanderson case the coal companies had the temerity to
urge the same reasons, as a ground for releasing them entirely
from the well settled duty to support the surface.' This the Supreme Court declined to do. It would have involved reversing a
host of decisions. Noonan v. Pardee is the best the operators
have been able to get from the court as yet along this line. Mr.
Johnson certainly earned all he got for his services in leading the
court to such a conclusion. We will await with interest the next
move of this favored industry.
Before Noonan v. Pardee the law books all said without
qualification that a surface owner had the right to have his surface supported. We must now state that his right is simply to
have it supported for six years after the removal of the coal.
What a terrific destruction of property rights! Who will say
that the legislature could have made such an enactment under the
constitution? Yet our Supreme Court has done just this, and
the poor surface owner has no appeal from its decrees.
'In his address before the Law Academy of Philadelphia delivered
June i8th, 19o2, and later published in pamphlet form. See particularly at
page 23 of pamphlet.
2See Robertson v. Coal Co. 172 Pa. 566, in which Justice Williams advo-

cates such a modification of the Sanderson rule as would involve a practical
return to the position of the court on the first three hearings of the Sanderson case.
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN.
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MOOT COURT.
FALLON VS. AGNEW
Agency-What Constitutes Ratification-Liability.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Without authority Hess undertook to sell furniture for Agnew. Hess
approached one Hood, who replied that he would buy from Agnew but for
the fact that he had seen certain furniture offered for sale by one Fallon,
and that he believed that this would meet his requirements. Hess then
proceeded to grossly misrepresent the reliability of Fallon and falsely
declared that his furniture was very cheap and inferior. Hood then gave
his order to Agnew, who promptly shipped his furniture and received
payment. Fallon then called on Hood, who told him all that Hess had said
about him and his goods. Fallon brings trespass against both Hess and
Agnew for $5oo damages. Agnew was entirely ignorant of the means used
by Hess in procuring the order from Hood until Failon filed his statement
of facts in the suit. He can prove that his profits on the sale were but $150
and he offers to rescind the sale to Hood and so open the way for Hood to
buy from Fallon. Hess is financially irresponsible. Hess has received $,oo
from Agnew for his services in making the sale. Fallon can prove that he
would have made $500 profit on the sale.
Mayo for the plaintiff.
An action will lie for defamation of title: Paull v. Halferty, 63 Pa. 46.
'Malice may be inferred from the circumstances of the case: Bolton and
wife v. Bray et al., 15 Phil. oo.

W. D. Lewis for the defendant.
If the agent exceeds his authority and makes himself liable, his principal
is not jointly liable with him: Kroeger v. Pitqairn, ioi Pa. 311; Lester v.
Stimson, 145 Pa. 3o. Knowledge of all material facts and circumstances is
an essential element to an effective ratification: Pittsburgh Ry. v. Gazzam,
32 Pa. 340; Loebisdy v. Rausch, 135 Pa. 532; Merrick Shread Mfg. Co. v.
Phila. Co., IY5 Pa. 314.

MAGRADY, J.-We have examined the case at issue with a scrutiny
not confined to the briefs of counsel and are forced to the conclusion that
as to Agnew an action will not lie. "In order to a ratification a full
knowledge of all the facts and circumstances attending the transaction is
essential": Gulick v. Grover, 4 Vr. (N.J.) 464; Combs v. Scott, 94 Mass. 493"
It appears that he had no knowledge of the methods employed by Hess
to induce Hood to buy Agnew's furniture.
It is a well founded principle 6f law that a stranger cannot make me
liable in tort, or on contract unless I subsequently ratify his act by accepting
the benefit of it, in which case, if I ratify part, it is aratification of the whole:
Gaines v. Miller, iI U. S. 395; Krider's Admr. v. Trustees of Western
College, 31 Iowa 547. The good cannot be separated from the bad. "Where
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one adopts a contract entered into without his authority, he must adopt it
altogether. He cannot ratify the beneficial part and reject the remainder":
Mundorff v. Wickersham, 63 Pa. 89. "If he elects to accept it that adoption
relates back to the time the act was performed and the same legal
consequences result as if the agent had been authorized in advance." Did
Agnew so elect? Keefe v. Sholl, 18x Pa. 92; Combs v. Scott, 94 Mass. 493.
It is true that Agnew paid Hess one hundred dollars for his services in
making the sale but the payment was made in ignorance of the facts which
induced Hood to buy the furniture. Upon receiving his summons in the
case Agnew had his first knowledge of Hess's acts derogatory to Fallon and
he ingenuously offered to rescind the sale to Hood in order to allow Fallon
to make and enjoy profit from a sale to Hood. Agnew's act was a complete
repudiation of Hess's acts. The law can require nothing fairer.
Hess voluntarily, without the semblance of justice, has done that which
the law specially forbids. He has wantonly assailedthe character of Fallon
with turpitude not permitted in the keenest kind of competition among rival
merchants; he has disparaged his goods sufficiently to deprive him of a
customer and thereby caused him a damage easily ascertained. For such
perverseness an action will lie: Paul v. Halferty, 63 Pa. 46. It is set forth
that Hess is financially irresponsible.
Of this fact the law cannot take
notice in the present case. He alone is answerable for the damage inflicted
on Fallon. The court can give only such relief as is lawful.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
This case conveniently resolves itself into two general questions, (1)
Was Hess liable to Fallon for the effects of his conduct, and (2) Is a
liability similar to that of Hess, imputed to Agnew?
Fallon had no contract with Hood. Had he had, nothing that appears
would have exempted Hood from the duty of performance. Fallon could
have recovered damages for his non-performance. Possibly, as some cases
intimate (Paull v. Halferty 63 Pa. 45) that fact would prevent any liability
on Hess's part, for the damage arising from Hood's non-performance,
although, in a sense, Hess was the cause of that non-performance.
Though Fallon had no right that Hood should take and pay for his
furniture, he did have a right that Hess should not by means of false
representations derogatory of Fallon's goods made for the purposd of
promoting his own gain or the gain of anybody else, e.g., the gain of Agnew,
induce Hood to refrain from doing what otherwise he would have done,
viz., buying from Fallon, to Fallon's loss.
Hess's motive was to benefit himself and Agnew. To effectthis object,
he was willing to prevent Fallon's gain of a customer; that is, to cause him a
negative loss, by means of a statement which, not known to be true and in
fact false, impeached the worthiness of Fallon's goods. This state of mind
may be termed "malice," although it is not important that we should so name
it: Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., 9 Exch.
218, L. R.; Awes' Cases, 63z.
It does not appear that Hess knew his statements werefalse. But they
were false. If he believed them to be true, that factshould have been made
to appear. A jury is justified.in inferring from the falseness of a statement,
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the want of belief of its truth, unless some evidence of such belief is tendered.
Had Hess believed the statement, he probably would not have committed a
wrong in making them, even if his motive was a self-seeking one, but in the
absence of belief of its truth he must be held as responsible as if he had
believed it untrue.
If Hess's statements had merely consciously exaggerated the merits of
Agnew's goods, though made in order to attract customers from rivals of
Agnew, Fallon would probably have had no right of action, although his loss
would have been just as large. Perhaps, had he untruly affirmed generally
the superiority of Agnew's goods to Fallon's, even with conviction that his
statement was untrue, he would have been exempt from liability. He has
done more. He has said that Fallon's furniture was "cheap and inferior."
While charitable allowance must be made for one competitor's laudations of
his own wares as better than those of his competitor, it is not necessary to
tolerate an untrue, absolute detraction of the latter's goods, made merely to
assist himself in procuring a customer whom otherwise the competitor might
procure. It is too much to expect the courts in a country in which, as they
say, Christianity is a part of the law, to insist that vendors shall not
consciously untruly exalt the merits of their wares, for the purpose of
deceiving buyers into buying from them, and into refraining from buying
from their rivals, but it is not necessary to wink at consciously untrue
derogation from the merits of others' goods, for the paganly supposed
laudable purpose of appropriating to one's self the custom that otherwise
would go to them.
The principle we intend to apply is this: where A, in order to induce X
to buy A's goods, or the goods of one in whose sale of goods A is interested,
as paid agent, relative, friend, falsely disparages to X, the goods of B, a
rival, without belief in the truth of what he is saying, and by such
disparagement transfers X's custom from B to A or the person in whose
interest A speaks, A will be liable to B for the loss thus occasioned. Hess
intentionally prevented a sale by Fallon to Hood, for the purpose of
promoting a sale by Agnew to Hood, by a disparagement of Fallon's goods,
which was in fact untrue, and which was not believed by bim to be true.
Fallon is therefore entitled to recover indemnity for the loss, which would,
under the evidence, be S5oo.
The remaining question is, does a liability, similar to that of Hess, attach
to Agnew?
Hess disparaged Fallon's goods, not primarily to injure Fallon but
because the injury was incidental to Agnew's effecting the sale of furniture
to Hood. Hess had not been appointed as agent by Agnew to sell his
furniture nor authorized to decry the furniture of Fallon. Why then is
Agnew liable for Hess's act? Has he in any way adopted or ratified it?
Hess influenced the mind of Hood without Agnew's knowledge. Hess
did not obtain Hood's order and deliver it to Agnew. Even if he had, Agnew
might have suspected or believed that he was acting as the agent of Hood.
But Hood himself approached Agnew and made the contract of purchase.
Did he say that Hess had spoken to him? No. How then are we to
construe Agnew's act into an adoption or ratification of Hess's acts, acts of
which he knew nothing? Surely Agnew had a right to sell furniture to
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Hood, and the fact that he does sell to him, does not make him responsible
for all the words that anybody may have uttered in the hearing of Hood, and
which influenced Hood's election of a vendor.
It appears that Hess has received $ioo from Agnew for his making the
sale possible. But he made the sale possible without having been employed
to do so, and we are not informed that Agnew learned of Hess's acts prior
to the sale to Hood. Surely a gratuitous payment by Agnew to Hess, after
the sale, is nbt to be tortured into a ratification of his act. Agnew had fully
performed the contract of sale, before he learned of Hess's agency.
Gratuitously rewarding him for it, without knowing the mode by which Hess
effected his object, is not an acceptance of the guilt of Hess's tortious words.
Hess was not employed to make contracts of sale, nor did he in fact
make such a contract. If he had, the contract might doubtless have been
ratified by Agnew. Hess made no contract which Agnew ratified. He did
no act which Agnew ratified. The case is simply this: that Hess did an act
intended to lead Hood to buy from Agnew. Hood did buy from Agnew.
Subsequently, learning that Hess had induced Hood, but not learning how,
Agnew gratuitously rewards him. How can this make a liability? If
Agnew had warmly thanked Hess, on learning that the latter had directed
Hood to him, would those thanks have made Agnew liable to Fallon to the
extent of $5oo? And how can it matter in what form Agnew's appreciation
of Hess's act as he, Agnew, at the time conceived it, was expressed,
whether in words or in a gift of money?
Judgment affirmed.

KELSO vs. TREAT.
Sale of Land-Vendor's Title at Time of Sale.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Kelso supposing Treat to own a farm agreed to pay him $3,ooo for it
and paid $5oo down. Two weeks later, Treat tendered the deed and de
manded the remaining $25oo. Meantime Kelso learned that Treat had not
owned the land but since the original negotiation had bought if for $2,000
from its actual owner. Kelso thereupon declined to accept the deed and
demanded back the $500. This is assumpsit. Treat knew that Kelso supposed him to be the owner, Kelso's words assuming that he was. Treat
however made no statement upon the subject.
Miss Jacobs for the plaintiff.
Fraud renders a contract voidable and puts party defrauded in a position to treat it as a nullity: Lay vs. DeCamp. 15 S. & R. 227; Mathers vs.
Pearson, 13 S. & R. 258.
Artifices intended to deceive or the suppression of material facts constitute fraud equally with positive misrepresentation and a contract induced
by means of them may be avoided: Martin vs, Pennock, 2 Pa. 376.
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No man can affirm that another has relied too implicitly on the truth
of what he himself stated: Griswold vs. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353.
Jones for the defendant.
A man may contract for the sale of property in which at time of making
the contract he had no title; Love vs. Harvey, 114 Mass. 8o. The sale is
valid if an actual delivery is intended; Story vs. Solomon, 71 N.Y. 420; Orwin vs. Williar, xo U.S. 499; George vs. Bartomer, 7 Watts 530.
The buyer is not bound to communicate intelligence of extrinsic circumstances in his possession; Laidlow v. Organ, 2 Wheaton 178; Kintzing
vs. McEleath, 5 Pa. 467.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARRETT, J.-At first glance, it might seem reasonable to suspect
that the element of fraud enters into the case and controls the decision, but
a further investigation of the facts will positively dispel that impression.
The element of fraud, then, being eliminated from the case, something else
must remain to commend itself to the consideration of the court. By reducing the issue, to its final analysis, we find it has to do with the relation of
vendor and purchaser, originatingin a bonafide transactionfor the sale of
land.
"In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the vendor need not
have a good title, or in fact any title even, at the time the contract is entered
into." Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 29, p. 6o8; Ley vs. Hubler, 3 Watts
367; Musselman's Appeal, 65 Pa. 488.
"It is at least sufficient that the contract is made by vendor in good
faith." Dressel vs. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407.
"There is good authority to the effect that, if good faith exists and the
vendor is able in season to convey the title he has undertaken to convey,
the purchaser will not be permitted to excuse himself from its acceptance,
though the vendor had not at the time the contract was made, such title and
capacity to convey or such means and right to acquire them, as would enable him to fulfill the contract on his part." Am. & Eng. 'Ency. of Law,
Vol. 29, p. 6o8; Dresel v. Jordan, supra. Moss v. Hanson, 17 Pa. 379.
We can find nothing in the evidence to show that the defendant was not
acting in good faith throughout the transaction, while, on the other hand,
we believe there is enough evidence to warrant the presumption that the
plaintiff did not act with the best of intentions. He certainly was not like
Caesar's wife-above suspicion. In this case, the #laintiff's invzilied charge
offraud is its own rebuttal.
The defendant, whose hands are unsullied, might very well go into
equity and obtain a decree, compelling the plaintiff to accept the deed for
the land he contracted for, and thereby prevent the plaintiff from perpetrating an injustice.
Satisfying our conscience that the correct soldtion of this ca,-e is to be
found in the authorities herein cited, we are brought irresistibly to the conclusion that judgment must be entered in favor of the defendant.
Judgment for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The question in this case is, can Kelso rescind the contract, or substantially the same thing, was the contract, on Kelso's part, subject to the implied condition that Treat at the time of making it, owned the land which
was its subject ?
When A contracts to convey a thing, personal or real, to B, he does not
impliedly represent that he then owns it. Though he does not own it, he may
buy it, in time to convey it; or, he may procure a conveyance of it from its
actual owner, directly to B. There are cases which hold that the nonownership of the land by the vendor at the making of the contract is no
obstacle to a decree in equity for specific performance by the vendee;
Dresel v. Jordan, xo4 Mass. 497- Still less is it an obstacle to the enforcement at law, of the vendee's contract to pay the purchase money. Ley v.
Huber, 3 W. 367. Cf. 29 Am. &. Eng. Ency. 6o8; 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1043.
It would follow from the vendor's power to compel the vendee to pay the
purchase money, that having paid it, or a part of it, the vendee cannot
recover it back.
It is suggested that Kelso may rescind the contract on the ground of
fraud. He believed, and intimated his belief, that Treat was, at the time of
the negotiation, the owner. But this did not put on Treat the duty of disabusing his mind. Kelso did not understand that Treat was representing
himself to be the owner. It was enough for him to take no means of deceiving Kelso. Besides, had Treat actively caused Kelso to believe him
the owner, it does not appear how Kelso's lownership was material.
Nothing warrants the inference that had Treat known the fact, he would not
have entered into the contract.
The price contracted to be paid by Kelso was $3,ooo, and Treat was able
to buy the land for $2,ooo. It was not Treat's legal duty to reveal to Kelso
who the present owner was or the price at which he was willing to sell it.
Judgment affirmed.

EDMINS'I ON V. LINDNFR.
Partnership-Married Woman=Sharing of Profits by HusbandRights of Creditors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Sarah Lindner, wife of Win. Lindner, having $i,o0o from her father,
opened a store and engaged her husband to conduct it for her, agreeing that he should have, as compensation, all the net profits. A debt of
$400 was contracted with Mr. Maples by Win. Lindner, but not on account
of the store. Maples, alleging that, Lindner was a partner with his wife,
sold out on execution, Lindner's alleged interest in the firm. It was bought
by the plaintiff for $5o.
This is a bill in equity against Mary for the settlement of the partnership and the payment to him of (Y2) one-half the residue after paying debts.

THE FORUM

163

Robertson for the plaintiff.
Not necessary that parties be partners inter se to incur partnership liability as to third persons. Miller v. Bartlett, x5 S. & R. 137, Edwards v.
Tracy, 69 Pa. 374. This is true when parties are man and wife. Loeb v.
Milligin, 12 Sup. 392; Noel v; Kinney, io6 N. Y.74. Bill in equity or action
of account, is proper remedy. Crow v. Green, i ii Pa. 637.
Gardner for the defendant.
Filed no brief.
OPINION OF COURT.
ROUSH, J.-The question in this case is whether a partnership exists
between Sarah Lindner, and Win. Lindner, her husband. If a partnership
exists, the plaintiff is entitled to a settlement of the partnership, but if
none exists, his bill must be dismissed.
There are three classes of cases in which parties may become liable to
third persons as partners; (1) Where they are actually partners inter se by
express agreement; (2) Where not being partners inter se or entitled to any
share of the profit, they hold themselves out to the world as such by acts or
declarations, and the particular creditor who sues, trusts them as partners,
in the faith of such acts or declarations; (3) Where there is an agreement to
receive a share of the profits as such and not a mere commission on profits,
or a sum equal to a certain share of the profits, as a compensation for services. Irwin v, Bidwell 72 Pa. 244 (x872).
The first two suppositions have no reference whatever to the case at
bar, and therefore if a partnership exists, it must arise under the third supposition. The rule was laid down in the old cases of Gracev. Smith 2 WM.
Bl. 998 (1775) and Waugh v. Carver 2 H. B1. 235 (793) that "He who takes
a moiety of all the profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law, be made
liable for losses, if losses arise, on the principle that, by taking a part of the
profits, he takes from the creditors a part of that fund which is the proper
security to them for the payment of their debts." This rule has been
adopted and is now the law in Penna. Purviance v. McClintic, 6 S. & R.
259 (1820); Edwards v. Tracy 62 Pa. 374 (1869); Lord v. Proctor, 7 Phila.
630 (1870).
The law as thus laid down has been modified by the rule, "That while
a right to share in the profits may constitute a partner, a commission
equal to such a share, as a compensation for services, does not." Edwards
v. Tracy, supra.
Although the old rule of Waugh v. Carver was overruled in England by
Cox v. Hickman, 8 House of Lords 267 )x86o), it still remains the law in
Pennsylvania. But we find a tendency in our later cases to depart from the
doctrine of Waugh v. Carver and to adopt that of Cox v. Hickman, which
is, "a right to participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive evidence that the trade in which the profits have been made was carried on in
part for or in behalf of the person setting up such claim. But the real
ground of liability is that the trade has been carried on by persons acting
on his behalf." Edwards v. Tracy, supra; Gibbs' Estate, 157 Pa. 59 (1893);
Walker v. Tupper 152 Pa. 1 (1892); Darling's estate7 Kulp 323 (894); Krall
v. Fromey 182 Pa. 7 (897).
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Moreover the old rule has been somewhat changed by the act of June

1i, 1871, (P. & L.., Partnership Sec. 17), which provides as follows:

"Indi-

viduals and corporations employing labor may give to employes, in addition to regular wages, or in lieu thereof, a conditional interest in the profits
of the business, to be regulated and determined by agreement between the
parties; and the employee receiving such conditional share of profits shall
not by reason thereof be deemed liable for the debts or losses of the busiiness, or have any voice in the management, except so far as may he clearly
defined in the constitution or agreement under which the association is organized or operations conducted."
Now he who alleges the existence of a partnership must prove it, and
the only evidence of a partnership in this case is the fact that Mr. Lindner
received the profits of the business for his compensation; and this is merely
cogent and not conclusive evidence according to the best modern decisions.
In view of this fact, and of the fact that Mr. Lindner's debt was contracted
distinct and separate from the business, and on account of the provisions of
of the act of 1871, June 15th, we feel constrained to decide that no partnership exists in this case and that the Plaintiff's bill must be dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Lindner, by his contract, is entitled to the net profits of his wife's business as his compensation for labor. If some of these profits traceable as
such have been invested in goods, probably he is entitled to these goods.
Any creditor of his has a right in some way, to apply to his debt the money
or goods to which he is thus entitled. But how? A, as creditor of B, who
in turn has an unliquidated claim against C, might possibly file a bill
against C as a creditor's bill, if the liquidation of the claim could not be
effected through an attachment-execution. But, under such a blll, the
contract between B and C would regulate the rights of A. He could
claim no more than could B.
Maple has not filed such a bill. He obtains a judgment against Lindner for his personal debt, and on the execution sells: not the goods of the
putative firm, but the putative interest of Lindner in that firm. It is entirely clear that while such an interest can be levied on and sold under a
ftcrifacias,only the residual interest of the 'partner, after paying all the
debts of the firm, will pass.
But the purchaser at such a sale, can buy only the interest of the alleged partner. The principle that when A takes a share of the profits of a
business conducted by another man he is a partner, has been invented, not
for the benefit of A, or of the creditors of A, but for the benefit of the creditors of the other man. The creditors of the other man are made by construction the creditors of it, who is made jointly liable to them. Nojointliability was affirmed by Maple or by Edmiston. The $400 debt was not contracted
on account of the store. It was in fact Lindner's own debt, only. He only has
been sued. His interest only has been attempted to be sold. In ascertaining
what Edmiston has bought, we need to consider simply what by virtue of
the contract, Lindner had a right to receive as compensation. He is not a
partner, and a bill for the settlement of a partnership account is wholly
inappropriate.
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The learned court below has investigated the relation between Lindner
and his wife, with a view to ascertaining whether it was one of partnership.
Nothing is supposed to have constituted them partners exce pt the provision that Lindner.was to be paid the profits. Cases have said that when
X is to receive a part of the profits of a business conducted by A, they are
constituted, iAsofacto so far as third persons are concerned, partners, but
when X is to receive a sum equal to all or a part of the profits, this partnership does not result. The distinction is admitted to be "very refined and
shadowy;" nay that it is a "distinction without any difference, has," says
Sharswood, C. J., "been generally conceded." Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa.
374. Yet, grave courts have continued even to our own time, to administer
this distinction and make important rights depend on it. If A employs B
to assist him in his business for one half of the profits, B is a partner; but
if A employs B to assist him for a sum of money equal to one half of the
profits, B is not a partner. The phrases mean the same thing. There is
verbally a distinction between them but there is no real difference. The
distinction is therefore stupid and absurd. Nevertheless, instead of rejecting
it, the courts say helplessly, "it is entirely too late now to question" it. "We
are bound to stand su5er antiqasvias." Edwards v. Tracy, sufira; Groves'
Appeal, 176 Pa. 354; which being interpreted means, our predecessors without justification made important differences of right depend on purely verbal
differences of phrase, and therefore we must continue to be so foolish as they.
It would shake our jurisprudence to its foundations, were we to cast over
this time-honored, judge-invented absurdity.
The thought underlying the doctrine that a sharer in the profits must
be treated as a partner, as far as creditors are concerned, is, that by sharing the profits he lessens the power of creditors to obtain payment of their
debts, This is true of any one creditor as against another. If A is a creditor and B becomes another, and obtains payment, he may lessen A's chance
of being paid. If C becomes a clerk or salesman for wages, and accepts
payment of his wages, he may lessen the chance of A or of B to be paid.
Then are all clerks and salesmen, all employeg for wage, to be treated as
partners?
It must be observed that Lindner was to receive only the net profits.
That is, only after whatever is necessary to pay debts, is taken out of the
business, is he to receive any compensation. Instead of lessening the creditor's ability to obtain payment, the arrangement would less interfere with
that ability than if Lindner was to receive a fixed sum weekly or monthly.
It would be intolerably stupid to hold that such an arrangement constituted
Lindner a partner.
We have not considered the right of Lindner to sue his wife, nor whether
he not being able to sue her the purchaser of his claim acquires this right.
Appeal dismissed.
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WIMBROW vs. CRAMP.

Sale of Personal Property-Contract-Warranty-Conditon-Measure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Wimbrow sold to Cramp ioo hams after Cramp told him thathe was getting them to sell in turn to Jas. Jordon, who would not take them unless they
had been cured by a certain person. Wimbrow said they had been
cured by this person. He ihad been so informed by the person from whom

he had bought them. When Cramp offered the hams to Jordon, the latter
refused to take them saying they were not cured by the person referred to.
They were in fact not so cured. Had Jordon taken the hams Cramp would
have made 25 per cent. by the transaction. This is assumpsit for the price
of the hams, $3co.
Forsyth for the plaintiff.
To constitute a warranty, must be shown that vendor intended to be
bound for truth of his statements. Wetheril v. Neilson, 2o Pa. 448. In
absence of agreement by seller, purchaser takes at his own risk asto quality.
Eagan v. Call, 34 Pa. 236.
Coursen ror the defendant.
As statement to curing of hams was a condition, contract discharged
and buyer released from liability thereunder. Tiffany on Sales, r5o; Lober
v. Baugh, 2 Wall. 728.
Statement constitutes a warranty, Warren v. Coal Co., 83 Pa. 440.
Breach of warranty a complete defense. Joseph v. Richardson, i Sup. 2o8.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COOKE, J.-In order to defend against this action, Cramp must show
that Wimbrow sold these hams to him under a warranty that they were
cured by a "certain person" and that he relied on this statement in purchasing same. The hams were of no use to Cramp unless they were exactly as
ordered and Wimbrow was aware of this fact. However, if he was merely
praising his wares in order to make a sale, he cannot be held to have sold
them under a warranty. To constitute a warracty, it is enough if the words
used are riot dubious or equivocal and it appears from the whole evidence
that the affirmant intended to warrant and did not express a mere matter
of judgment or opinion. A contract to deliver goods of a quality, as well
as a species defined and fixed, is as capable of enforcement as any other
contract- Warren et. al. v. Phila. Coal Co., 83 Pa. 437. This doctrine has
been repeatedly held by the Pennsylvania Courts. In Holt v. Pie, .o2Pa.
425, where lumber ordered was "good sound hemlock," it was held that no
other grade of hemlock would do. In Halloway v. Jacoby, i2o Pa. 583,
where defendant offered to sell a carload of corn, and plaintiff replied,
"We will give 53 cents pei bushel provided it is good, salable corn," Court
said, "Nothing else but good salable corn fills the measure of the agreement." It is unnecessary to say whether the stipulation is a warranty or a
condition. it is a term of the contract, and if broken by the plaintiff they are
liable for the breach. Mining Co. v. Jones, io8 Pa. 55; Joseph v. Richard-
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son, 2 Sup. 208. Also in Gretzinger's Sons v. Kann & Co., 165 Pa. 578,
Judge Green held, that an offer to sell "thoroughly tanned" leather when
accepted constituied a warranty and nothing else but "thoroughly tanned'leather would satisfy it.
In case at bar, the fact as to whether or not the hams had been curedby a
"certain person" went to the very essence of the contract. Even though
there were some doubt as to whether or not plaintiff could be held to have
warranted his wares, under the Pennsylvania decisions, the case would
come under the Statute of May 4. 1899, P. & L. 4266. "In every case of
green, salted, pickled or smoked meats, lard or other articles of merchandise,
used wholly or in part for food, said goods or merchandise, shall correspond in
kind and quality with description given, either orally or in writing, by the
vendor." Defendant has not offered to return the goods, hence he cannot
be totally discharged from payment, as is requested by his counsel.
Neither can he set off his damages, both general and special against plaintiff's claim. Where goods of a certain grade are ordered and goods of a
different grade are sent, the purchaser may deduct the difference in value
between the two grades. Whitehall Mfg. Co!, v. Wise et. al., 21 W. N. C.,
266. Where an article has not been returned, the measure of damages ordinarily is the difference between the value of the article delivered and the
value of the article agreed to be delivered. Joseph v. Richardson, supra;
Seigworth v. Leffel, 76 Pa. 476; Himes v. Kuhl, 154 Pa. 19o. But a vendor
cannot recover the expenses incident to his adjustment of difference between himself and another to whom he had made a sale of goods in controversy, Joseph v. Richardson, supra. This is a question of fact for the jury,
who will ascertain the value of the hams delivered; and give verdict for
plaintiff for price of hams $300, less difference between value of those ordered and those delivered.
OPINION OF SU?REME COURT.
Cramp told Wimbrow that he was getting the hams on order to sell
them to Jordan, who would not take them unless they had been cured by
A. Wimbrow assured him that they had been cured by A, and, thus convinced, Cramp accepted the hams. Was their having been cured by A, a
condition to which Cramp's duty to acceptor retain them, was subject? We
think it was.
In order to make a condition, it is not necessary that the word condition should be used by the parties. They may call what is in fact a condition by the word warranty, Benjamin, Principles of Sales 28; or by any
other word. It is enough if the vendee causes the vendor to understand
that he will retain and pay for the goods, only if they are of a certain quality,
or have had a certain history, etc. The facts proved would warrant a jury
in finding that Cramp was known to Wimbrow to intend to retain and pay
for the hams, and that he reasonably understood that Wimbrow assented to
this intention, only if they had been cured by A. It is not necessary that
they should find that Cramp's intention was that he was not to retain the
hams, though cured by A, unless Jordan would in fact take them. Cf. Wise
v. Wilby, 30 Super. 484; Joseph v. Richardson, 2 Super. 208.
Whether a representation is a condition or not, does not depend upon
the honesty with which it is made. Wimbrow had been told that the hams
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had been cured by A and probably believed his informant, but he might
nevertheless agree to sell them to Cramp on the condition that they in fact
had been cured by A.
The hams when tendered by Cramp were rejected by Jordan, because
they had not been cured by A, and they had in fact, not been cured by A.
The condition on which Cramp purchased, had been broken, and he had a
right, insisting on it, to tender back the hams. He has not done so. The
condition ceases to be available as such, but it becomes a warranty for
the breach of which Cramp is entitled to damages. Benjamin, Principles
of Sales, 27; Tiffany, Sales p. 247. While ordinarily the damages recoverable upon the warranty would be the difference between what would have
been the value of the hams, had they been. cured by A, and their actual
value, in this case the loss of the bargain would be properly recoverable.
The seller knew that the purchase was made for the purpose of fulfilling
another existing contract, Benjamin, Principles of Sales, 202, or another
definite contract which he reasonably expected to make immediately. Cramp
would have made 25 per cent, had he sold to Jordan. It follows that this
profit as damages, should be set off against Wimbrow's price, that is, that
Wimbrow should recover but three quarters of the price.
Tiffany,
Sales, 240. Wimbrow knew that Cramp was buying in order to sell to
Jordan; and that Cramp would probably make some profit upon this resale,
as well as incur some expense. It is not unreasonable therefore, to compel
him to compensate Cramp for the loss thus suffered by him in direct and
forseeable consequence of his breach of the warranty.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
COMMONWEALTH VS. JOHNS.
Twice in Jeopardy-Former Acquittal.
Faller, for Commonwealth.
Johnson for defendant.
MORAN, J.-The defendant on a charge of murder in the first degree
was convicted of assault, and on appeal was reversed on an erroneous admission of evidence and sent back for retrial. Whereupon the defendant
was convicted of murder in the second degree. The defendant again appealed.
Assuming from the record of the case, that a verdict of assault can be
found on an indictment of murder in the first degree, the question'to be determined in this case is, can there be a conviction of a higher degree of
crime on the second trial than was found on the first trial, or in other words
does such conviction operate as an acquittal of all higher degrees than that
found.
The question has been mooted in Pennsylvania only to a limited extent,
and has never been presented to the Supreme Court. Within the judicial
districts of the counties are found directions to the effect that a defendant
convicted of a constituent offense cannot,on a new trial and on the same indictment be found guilty of a higher offense.
In Com. v. Winters, i Pa. C. C. 537, the Court in instructing a jury in a
new trial on an indictment upon which the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree as follows, said,"the jury cannot convict of ahigher
crime than murder in the second degree. The former verdict, on this indictmentof guilty of murder in the second degree, is as effectual an acquittal
of murder in the first degree as if they said not guilty."
The decisions of the county courts are not binding upon any other since
their adjudications are not final and it remains for the Supreme Court of
the State to authoritatively declare the law upon thissubject. The Court
cannot satisfy itself with the result of the County Court decisions, since the
reasons for so deciding are either poorly assigned or not asserted at all.
We look, then, to the law as enunciated by the higher courts of other States.
The first question, which addresses itself to the Court, is the signification of a new trial. It has been defined to be the re-investigation of the
facts in a case, or rather, of the legal rights of the parties upon disputed
facts. The term new trial, therefore, as applied to a jury case, has reference solely to an issue which has already been passed upon by a jury. In
a civil case there would be no doubt where pait of the issue has been found
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for defendant and he should obtain a new trial, that the whole issue would
be reopened for investigation on the second trial. Thb principle according
to the tendency of the Courts, is extended to criminal cases, so far as the
revision of verdicts is concerned. Hurley vs. State, 6 Ohio 403.
The ground relied on to withdraw criminal cases from the operation of
the general rule, is the provision in the Bill of Rights, which declares that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
We think the position of former jeopardy, on account of a new trial, secured at the instance of the defendant, who is now complaining, to be wholly
untenable and incorrect. How can the prisoner complain of having been deprived of a constitutional privilege when the loss of it has been
entirely of his own volition and initative? His appeal on an erroneous admission of evidence, was a tacit admission of his willingness to undergo a
second trial on the same indictment. The prisoner, according to our adjudicated cases was not out of jeopardy until final judgment which was not as
yet found in this case. The Court thinks it only necessary to quote Com. v.
Lutz, 200 Pa. 226, to sustain the position that when a defendant has been
granted a new trial, he cannot succeesfully plead former jeopardy. Cf. W.
S. v. Harding, i Wall. Jr. 127.
To return to the question, having eliminated the former jeopardy plea,
whether the defendant can be convicted on a retrial of a higher degree of
crime, we are constrained to say that it must be answered in the affirmative.
State v. Behimer, 20 Ohio 572; Bohanan v. State 15 Neb 2o9; Com, v. Arnold 83 Cy, i; -Livingston's case, Grat. (Tas) 593.
Wharton in his criminal law recognizes a distinction on this point between cases where the indictment contain-several counts, on some of which
there is an acquittal and on others a conviction, and where there is but one
count which includes a greater and a less charge, maintaining that, in the
latter, if there is a conviction of the inferior degree of offence and a new
trial, the new trial will open the whole case, but that such would not be the
effect of the former class of cases.
It is manifest by the reversal of the judgment of conviction and the
granting of a new trial there is no verdict or judgment in existence, acquitting or convicting the accused of any of the degrees of the offence of which
he stands charged. The prisoner stands then as if he had undergone no
trial, for the reversal sent it back to be tried de novo, as if it had never before taken place, as far as his guilt or innocence of any crime is concerned.
The evidence which convicted the prisoner of assault was the evidence
which was intended to convict him of homicide and it was the same evidence, upon the admission of which the reversal took place. If it was inadmissible ona question of assault, then it was inadmissible on the question
of homicide which is the issue trying.
The appeal took with it the exceptions to the evidence, the rulings of
the court, which could be only understood in the light of the indictment,
which was for homicide, and upon reversal it again placed before the court
the question undetermined. There was then no adjudication that any person had been killed, that any assault had been committed, nor that any
other crime had been committed.
It has been well said in Stewart V. State 15 Ohio 155, "But the effect
of setting aside the verdict finding the defendant guilty, was to leave at
issue and undetermined the fact of the homicide; also the fact whether the
defendant committed it, if one was committed. The legal presumption on
his plea of not guilty was of his innocence and the burden was on the state
to prove every essential fact. There can be no legal determination of the
character of the malice of a defendant in respect to a homicide, which he is
not found to have committed, or rather of which, under his plea, he is in
lav presumed to be innocent."
Having come to the conclusion that the verdict is not severable and
that the whole verdict was set aside in the granting of the new trial, we can
discover no basis on which to hold that the defendant is entitled to an acquittal-of all degrees of crime above an assault. The verdict as rendered is,
therefore, sustained.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
"No person" says the ioth section of Act I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, "shall, for the same offence, be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." This provision, if we are to believe Creary v. Commonwealth 29
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Pa. 323,-applies only to capital crimes. It follows that, in cases less than
capital, there is no constitutional safeguard against repetition of jeopardy
for the same offence, even when the accused has been convicted or acquitted.
For immunity from a second trial after an acquittal or a conviction, he must
trust to the common law.
Johns has been indicted for a capital offence. He is therefore protected by the constitutional prohibition.
He was in jeopardy when the first jury was sworn. Alexander v. Com.
1o5 Pa. i; Com. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577, 3 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, 3465.
When the second jury was sworn, he was again put in jeopardy. The letter
of the constitution has therefore been violated.
But constitutions, like statutes, are not always what they seem. The
courts have for various reasons, made exceptions to the provisions in question. A judge or a juror may die, or become ill; the defendant himself may
become ill. This would oblige the suspension of the trial, and a new one
would become necessary, if the accused is not to be set free. Possibly the
inability of the jurors to agree, demonstrated by their fruitless efforts over
a sufficiently long time, to agree, would justify the dismissal of the jurors
without verdict and a new trial.
The defendant may agree that the jury shall be discharged without
rendering a verdict, and probably, if it is thereupon discharged he would be
constitutionally subjected to a second jeopardy. The jury may even have
rendered a verdict, and the prisoner, dissatisfied with it, may obtain, either on
application to the trial court, or by appeal to the appellate court, a new
trial. If he does, there is no doubt that he can be subjected to a second
jeopardy, Com. v. Lutz, 2oo Pa. 226. It is even held that without his consent, the trial court may set aside the conviction and order a new trial, thus
without his consent subjecting him to a second jeopardy; Com. v. Gabor,
209 Pa. -oi; a plain case of partially repealing the constitutional provision,
and also the common law principle that gives validity to the plea of former
conviction. In the case just cited, the court argues that since an appellate
court might set aside the conviction, the trial court must also be able to do
so, ignoring the fact that the appellate court cannot set aside the verdict
except with the consent and at the instance of the accused, while in Com. v.
Gabor, the trial court set aside the judgment without Gabor's consent.
If the question were simply, whether, having been convicted of an assault the defendant could, on a second trial, be again convicted of it, it is
clear that it would necessarily receive an affirmative answer. But the question is other than this. It is, can Johns at the second trial, be exposed to
the danger of a conviction for homicide? That he cannot, is reasonably
clear in Pennsylvania. A conviction on one of several counts, or of a less
crime included in a greater, is rezarded as an acquittal of the other counts,
or of the greater crime, and even though the defendant procures a new trial,
he cannot be tried for any other offence than that of which he was convicted: Hollister v. Com. 6o Pa. 1o3; Sadler's Crim. Procedure, p. 334; CoM.
v. Winters, i Pa. C. C. 537.
The acquittal of the larger offence, not explicit, but implicit in the conviction of the smaller, might, without offence to logic, be deemed inseparable from the conviction, so that the setting aside of the latter would be a
setting aside also of the former. Such is the view taken in a number of
States, among which are Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska,
Virginia, Ohio, Oklahama. It is in them held that if the conviction is set
aside the implied acquittal is also set aside. In Alabama, Louisiana, Missisippi, Tennesee. and Wisconsin, the view is taken that the implied acquittal
is separable from the implying conviction, and that, although at the defendant's instance the latter is set aside, the former abides, so that the second
trial may be only for the offence of which the prisoner was found guilty.
This we think, is the "Pennsylvania view." In the present case said Mitchell, C. T.in Coin. v. Gabor. sufira, "the indictment was for murder, but
the verdict was zuilty of manslaughter. Under the decisions of this State,
the verdict of manslaughter was so far an acquittal of murder, that the appellant cannot now be found guilty on that indictment of any higher grade
than manslaughter. He has therefore, every thing to gain and nothing to
lose by another trial and the constitutional prohibition against putting twice
in jeopardy for the same offence has no application here."
Judgment reversed.

